In this paper we study the determination of optimal water storage capacity in a region, taking into account that the supply of the resource, the flow into the reserve, is uncertain, that a measure of the uncertainty, the variance, is likely to increase with climate change, that building capacity is costly, and that the development of water resources may entail also en¨ironmental costs. We find that water storage capacity in the long run is positi¨ely related to increases in uncertainty if the marginal benefit of water withdrawal is con¨ex and that, for the case of costly reversibility of investment, a range of inaction for investment appears, and the stability of water storage capacity with respect to changes in variance increases.
INTRODUCTION
Warming of the atmosphere over the next century or two, as predicted in models of global climate change, may bring an increase in the variability of precipitation in many regions, including large parts of North America. This is not one of the more widely discussed changes, but at least a couple of recent studies, one theoretical and one empirical, offer support for the hypothesis. The empirical finding is of course related to past evolution of the climate. Over approximately the past century, as global mean temperature has increased by perhaps half a degree w x Celsius, a careful statistical analysis of patterns of precipitation by Karl et al. 13 finds, for the United States, relatively more precipitation coming from fewer Ž events. Precipitation events were classified as light, medium, and extreme with . specific quantitative bounds , and the distribution was found to have shifted over time so that a larger proportion of total precipitation is now derived from the extreme category. During the same period there was no discernible trend in total precipitation.
What does this portend for future climate change? Of course, the observed statistical relationship between temperature and variability of precipitation could be reversed, if some underlying causal mechanism is upset, but there is a theoretical argument that is consistent with a continuation of the trend. With warming, there is an increase in the ability of the atmosphere to hold water, as well as increased evaporation. Naturally occurring droughts are thus likely to be exacerbated. At the same time, since most of the precipitation in an area comes from atmospheric moisture transported from outside the area, and there is now more w x moisture in this form, precipitation events will be stronger 19 . The hypothesis of a more vigorous hydrological cycle is endorsed by the latest IPCC report, which sees w x prospects for both more severe droughts and more extreme rainfall events 12 .
The question considered in this paper is, what are the implications for investment in water reserves of the hypothesized increase in the variability of water flows? Note the shift from precipitation to water flows. We state the question in this way because only a part of the relevant increase in variability is expected to be derived from a shift in the proportion of extreme precipitation events. There is also a more subtle shift in patterns of precipitation. In many regions, as found for w x example in California by Gleick 9 , more precipitation will fall as rain and less as snow, and the snowpack will melt earlier in the year. Both of these changes will increase the variability of water flows since a late-melting snowpack in effect evens out flows over the course of the year. In other words, even if there were no change in the variability of precipitation, global warming could be expected to increase the variance of water flows.
There is one issue we need to raise before proceeding. It has been argued elsewhere that most of the economic literature on climate change focuses on the impact on flows of goods and servicesᎏfor example, how would the output of a crop be affected by, say, a warmer, drier, climate in a regionᎏrather than on w x stocks of capital 8 . It seems to us that important impacts of climate change are likely to arise from the destruction or premature obsolescence of capital stocks. The implied disequilibrium adjustment costs could dwarf the comparative statics effects conventionally estimated. A dramatic, and relevant, illustration of this point Ž . is provided by recent winter 1997 damaging floods in California. An unusually warm, moisture-laden front dumped a lot of rain in the Sierra Nevada mountains, melting some of the accumulated snowpack, and the combined runoff overwhelmed flood control dams in the foothills, and water channels in the valleys and the San Francisco BayrDelta. With continued warming, this sort of event would become Ž less unusual, and the expected value of the consequences over $1 billion from just . this one event presumably large enough to warrant analysis. The purpose of this paper is to make a start on the analysis.
Although there is a substantial literature on uncertainty in water resource management, we have not found anything of immediate relevance. The literature is concerned primarily with the impact of stochastic surface water flows on the value of additional stocks, either surface reservoirs or groundwater aquifers, and on w x optimal withdrawals from these stocks. Tsur and Graham-Tomasi 20 show that Ž the buffer value of groundwater to mitigate impacts from fluctuations in surface . flow is positive and, in an application to wheat farming in the northern Israeli w x Negev region, significant in magnitude. Knapp and Olson 14 consider the relationship between socially optimal and common property withdrawals from a groundwater stock. Relatively small gains from optimal management are found in w x an application to Kern County, California. Tsur and Zemel 21 study the impact of an uncertain irreversible event, such as pollution, that may render a groundwater resource unusable. A key finding is that it does not pay to extract in excess of recharge, even though this would be beneficial under certainty.
Not in the context of water resources, storage has been related to analysis of the firm's decisions under uncertainty. The standard inventory control problem has w x focused on planning production under demand uncertainty 5 . More recently, w x w x Scheinkman and Schechtman 17 and Stokey and Lucas 18 have presented a competitive, partial equilibrium model with storage under supply uncertainty that reflects approximately the production conditions of agricultural commodities which are not traded internationally. For nonrandom demand, they study the market equilibrium of a storable commodity whose output each period depends on previous period effort on production and a realization of a shock that affects all producers equally.
Although we too focus on supply uncertainty, our model presents two new features. First, we connect the analysis with the theory of investment, considering in an explicit way the cost of building the stock. We assume that there exists some kind of complementarity between water storage capacity and a capital stock of dams and canals, and that, therefore, a larger reserve in the long run requires a larger capital stock. A second novel feature of our model is the specification of possibly irreversible environmental impacts associated with the investment in water resources infrastructure. Here we develop a more general approach that that of the earlier literature that introduced the notion of irreversibility of environmental w x Ž . impacts 4, 11 . We consider the possibility of costly recovery of the natural environment, studying the case of a reversible development where the cost of disinvestment in development is the cost of removing water infrastructure and restoring something like the original environment. w x Our approach to the problem is based on that used by Pindyck 15 to study the optimal investment of the firm under uncertainty with adjustment costs. Basically, it is an extension of the comparative analysis used in deterministic control theory to evaluate changes in steady state values caused by variations in the model's parameters. We assume that water resources evolve through time according to a geometric Brownian motion and we derive the steady state conditions of the corresponding stochastic control problem. Then we use these steady state conditions to evaluate how the long-run equilibrium will be modified by changes in the variance rate of the stochastic process which imply changes in the variance of water resources. In this way we are able to answer the question posed at the beginning of this section: what are the implications for long-run water storage of an increase in uncertainty, in the sense of an increase in variability of water flows, caused by climate change? Ž . Our main results are: 1 With symmetric linear adjustment costs an increase in uncertainty implies an increase in long-run capital stock if the marginal benefit function associated with water withdrawal is convex. We find that with con¨ex marginal benefits the net marginal value of the capital stock is positi¨ely related to the instantaneous variance rate which characterizes water flow as a stochastic process. Then an increase in variance shifts upward the net marginal value function Ž . and leads to an increase in the optimal capital stock. 2 The existence of asymmetric linear adjustment costs reduces the variability of optimal investment in water infrastructure. The asymmetry defines a range of inaction and increases the Ž . stability of the long-run capital stock with respect to changes in variance. 3 If there is no market for water resource infrastructure, and if in addition environmental restoration is costly, changes in variance again do not affect the optimal level of reserves. In this case, the range of inaction is larger, suggesting an interpretation of the earlier literature on project investment with irreversible environmental impacts. Irreversibility can be considered an economic phenomenon, related to the cost of disinvestment: the range of inaction is increasing with the cost of disinvestment.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we set up the model as a stochastic control problem of maximization of the expected present value of net social welfare from water reserves management and investment in storage capacity. In Section 3 we obtain the expected dynamics of water consumption which allows us to characterize the long-run equilibrium capital stock, and in Section 4 we discuss the effects of an increase in uncertainty on the equilibrium. In this first part of the paper we assume a symmetric adjustment cost function in order to focus on the effects of uncertainty. In the second part, Section 5, we incorporate into the model more realistic assumptions about the reversibility of investment, looking first at asymmetric purchase and sale costs of capital, and then at costly reversibility of investment. Conclusions are restated in Section 6.
THE MODEL
We now present a formal description of the model: let W and w represent stochastic water resources and water withdrawal respectively. We assume that W evolves through time according to a geometric Brownian motion 1 :
Then the difference between the stochastic water resources and the control variable, water withdrawal, determines the increment in water reserves, S, but reserves cannot increase above the storage capacity defined by the physical capital stock, K. In symbols,
where ␣ is a conversion factor that gives storage capacity as a function of the capital stock. In this formulation dz is the increment of a Wiener process and W is the¨ariance rate. Observe Ž . that 1 does not contain a deterministic drift component. The reason to adopt this particular specification is twofold: first, we do not find enough hydrological justification for a drift component; second, for this type of stochastic process, W will be lognormally distributed and will always be positive with expected value constant and equal to its initial value, and variance increasing with respect to , w Ž .
. w x W t s W e y1 , see Dixit and Pindyck 6, p. 72 . 0 2 We assume that the conversion factor ␣ is calculated taking into account, among other things, the reduction in water storage capacity caused by the mud sedimentation on reservoirs' floor.
Ž .
3 Utility depends on water withdrawal U w , with U ) 0 and U -0. There are w w w of course costs of withdrawal, the costs of conveying water to its place of final Ž . consumption by farms, municipalities and firms, C w , with C ) 0 and C F 0.
The concavity of this function is explained by the existence of increasing returns to scale in the technology because pipeline volume increases more rapidly than built surface. Finally, the capital stock K evolves according tȯ
where I is investment and ␦ is the rate of depreciation. We assume that the built Ž . storage carries environmental costs, H K , with H ) 0 and H ) 0. Environ-
mental costs are included because, in its natural state, the environment yields some benefits. Then, for a risk neutral authority, the problem is to choose w and I to maximize the expected present value of net social benefits,
Ž . subject to differential equations 1 , 2 , and 3 where r is the social discount rate.
Notice that assuming a risk neutral authority is compatible with a concave utility function if we distinguish between the utility that consumers obtain from water Ž . consumption and the net welfare generated by management of water reserves and investment in storage capacity. For this formulation social welfare is defined as the difference between the consumers' surplus from water consumption net of withdrawal costs, and the environmental and adjustment costs of the capital stock, as Ž . 4 given by the expression in brackets in Eq. 4 .
INVESTMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY
Let J be the value of water reserves and capital stock assuming w is chosen optimally, so that
Ž . fare and P и is the net consumers' surplus or benefit from water consumption.
Because time appears in the maximand only through the discount factor, the Bellman equation for this problem can be written as
3 As we are interested in the socially optimal management of water reserves the utility function must be interpreted as a monetary measure of consumer welfare from water consumption. This measure could be the gross consumers' surplus so that the price of water would be the marginal utility of water consumption. 4 To analyze the effects of different attitudes toward risk we could introduce explicitly a water management authority's utility function whose argument would be the social welfare as it has been Ž . defined above. In our model we implicitly assume that this utility function is linear risk neutrality .
where is the multiplier associated with the restriction S F ␣ K; is positive if S s ␣ K, and zero otherwise.
Since W is a stochastic process, we can use Ito's Lemma to writê 
since dz is equal to dt, from the definition of a Wiener process. Applying the Ž . Ž . w x differential operator 1rdt E to 7 and considering that E dz s 0, again from t t the definition of a Wiener process, the Bellman equation can be written as
Maximizing with respect to w and I we have the optimality conditions:
Ž .
K
On the margin, water must be equally valuable in its two uses: consumption and Ž Ž .. water reserve accumulation Eq. 9 , and productive factors must be equally valuable in their two uses: capital accumulation in dams and canals and capital Ž Ž .. 6 accumulation in other productive activities of the economy Eq. 10 . The marginal value of water for consumption is given by the marginal benefit function, P , whereas the marginal value of water for storage is defined by J , i.e. the w S ''price'' used to value increments to water reserves. For investment, the marginal value of capital is given by J , again the ''price'' used to value increments to capital K stock whereas c, the price of capital goods, represents the opportunity cost of the investment. In a certainty framework the stocks would not be valuable and the optimal policy would be to consume water until the marginal benefit is zero and to not build any stock. However, under uncertainty about water resource availability it pays to build a stock to smooth the variations and guarantee a minimum level of 5 w x See Dixit and Pindyck 6, p. 71 . 6 The second order condition requires a decreasing marginal utility. However, this is a necessary condition but not sufficient to satisfy the second order condition because of the assumed concavity of Ž . the cost function for withdrawing and distributing water, C w . See the appendix for an evaluation of the scope of this problem.
consumption, as we shall show in Section 4. Although S does not appear directly in the social welfare function, B, a value is imputed to it by the stochastic behavior of the natural resource. The value for capital is due to the complementarity between water storage and a capital stock of dams and canals since it is not feasible to store water without infrastructure.
To examine how uncertainty affects long-run capital stock, we shall need to derive an expression for the expected dynamics of water consumption and investment, thus making the transition from the Bellman equation to solution of the stochastic control problem defined in Section 2 in terms of one stochastic differential equation for the control variables, water consumption and investment, and the Ž . Ž . Ž . differential equations 1 , 2 , and 3 . It will then be possible to use that system of Ž . equations to characterize a long-run steady state stochastic equilibrium and evaluate the effects of changes in variance on long-run capital stock or storage capacity. 7 Ž . Differentiating Eq. 8 with respect to S for the optimal values of control variables, w and I, we obtain
Ž . Since the terms in the two first set of parentheses sum to zero, J is given by 9 , 
Ž . Since the terms in the two first set of parentheses sum to zero, J is given by 10 ,
Ž . Applying the differential operator to 10 and equating it to 21 , we get
since c is a constant. This condition establishes that investment in new capacity will take place only when reserves reach capacity. The shadow price of the constraint, Ž . , is equated to r q ␦ c, the opportunity cost of capital plus H , the environmen-K tal costs, and 1r␣ is a conversion factor, the capital requirement to store an Ž . additional unit of water. In that case 19 becomes water consumption, water reserves and capital stock is zero, and the expected values of control, w, and state variables, S and K, must satisfy these conditions. Then we can use the steady state conditions to study how the expected value of Ž . water reserves, S, long-run equilibrium , when s 0 and the expected value of Ž . capital stock, K, and storage capacity, ␣ K long-run equilibrium , when ) 0 will be affected by changes in the variance of water flow in a way dependent on the Ž . Ž .
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properties of the net benefit function, P w , associated with water consumption.
EFFECTS OF UNCERTAINTY
To obtain the long-run equilibrium for capital stock and consequently for Ž . storage capacity we are going to analyze the steady state optimality condition for Ž . Ž . water withdrawal defined by 1rdt E dw s 0 and Eq. 23 , assuming ) 0. As t Ž . ) 0 implies S s ␣ K, Eq. 23 can be written as where the number of state variables has been reduced to two: W, water resources, and K, capital stock. 9 The marginal benefit, on the left-hand side of this condition, presents two components, the marginal utility and the present value of a flow of benefits originated when a marginal unit of water is devoted to consumption instead of being stored. This second term appears because when we are defining the optimal long-run equilibrium for the capital stock, an increment in consumption turns into a reduction in storage costs equal to the opportunity cost of capital, Ž . rq␦ c, plus the environmental costs, H , a reduction that must be taken into K account to correctly define the optimality condition for water withdrawal. Notice that when a unit of water is devoted to consumption the reduction in capital is given by the inverse of the conversion factor: 1r␣. On the other side, the marginal cost of water consumption incorporates a term related to the instantaneous variance rate whose sign depends on the convexity of the marginal net benefit function, P , for water consumption. x As Pindyck 15, p. 421 has pointed out, we can also use these steady state conditions to determine how, given a current realization of W, the values of w, S, and K that satisfy the steady state conditions Ž will change with variance, so that we can determine the effects of uncertainty for a given value of water . resources even if in the long-run there is no stationary distribution for this variable. 9 For this reason we write from now on the optimal policy function depending only on W and K. If To interpret this last component, let us assume that the marginal benefit is convex, i.e., that P ) 0. Then for variations of water withdrawal around its w w w Ž . expected value, as P marginal net benefit defines the marginal valuation of w water withdrawal by consumers, a reduction in consumption has a larger impact on consumers' welfare than an increase, and there is an incenti¨e to reduce water withdrawal, to store water to avoid low consumption due to low realizations of W. If P -0, i.e., if the marginal benefit function is concave, a reduction in w w w consumption has a lower impact on consumers' welfare than an increase and then the incentive is to increase water withdrawal and reduce water reserves. We shall have more to say about the sign of P shortly.
w w w Ž . In any event, Eq. 24 allows us to determine the effect of an increase in variance Ž . on optimal capital or storage capacity for the resource flow W equal to its
or in other words, the expected value of water consumption at the stochastic steady Ž . state is going to be the expected value of water resources, W. Then Eq. 24 can be rewritten as . NMV . Before using this condition to determine the effects of an increase in uncertainty about future water resources, we need to verify that a solution exists. To do this, we assume that the cross partial derivative Ѩ 2 wrѨ WѨ K is negati¨e. Although we have developed the analysis presented in this section also for a positive cross partial derivative, it seems plausible that only the negative sign is 10 When there exists a steady state distribution for the capital stock the optimal value is just the expected value, given that the expected values of w and K have to satisfy the steady state conditions. In Ž . the other case non existence , the optimal value is the value that satisfies the steady state conditions when the current value of water resources is its expected value. Obviously the definition of a true steady state implies that the expected value, W, be constant, as it is in the case of the stochastic process used in this model. relevant: Ѩ 2 wrѨ WѨ K -0 means that an increase in the capital stock, K, and consequently in storage capacity, weakens the link between flow, W, and withdrawals, w; a decrease in capital stock strengthens the relationship between flow and withdrawals. We have not been able to trace the sign of the cross partial derivative to the model's primitive functions, but it seems to us that there is a strong intuitive justification for a negative sign. The relationship between flow, W, and withdrawals, w, must be positive in the absence of storage capacity, K. If storage is introduced, that relationship must be weakened, or in other words, the positive first derivative, Ѩ wrѨ W, must fall, yielding a negative cross partial derivative, Ѩ 2 wrѨ WѨ K. The reason is that, with storage, it is possible to have large withdrawals even with a small flow, thus depleting the reserve, S, or small withdrawals with a large flow, augmenting the reserve. In this case we obtain the following result: 
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Assuming that optimal water consumption responds positively to water resources Ž . Ž . Ѩ w r Ѩ W ) 0 the net marginal value function is monotonically decreasing, since
Then if the marginal value for zero capital stock is higher than the constant Ž . marginal cost, Eq. 26 has a unique solution, as illustrated in Fig. 1 .
Notice that as the marginal value of the capital stock is positively related to the variance of water resources it could happen that for a low variance it does not pay to build a stock because the cost is greater than the benefit of the first unit built. For Ѩ 2 wrѨ WѨ K ) 0 neither existence nor uniqueness are guaranteed since the slope of the marginal revenue function is not determined. 12 We are now ready to determine the effect on the capital stock of a change in Ž . variance. Totally differentiating optimality condition 26 , we obtain
Ž . These conditions are sufficient assuming that sufficient conditions in maximization problem 8 of the Bellman equation are satisfied. 12 2 Ž . However, if Ѩ wrѨ WѨ K ) 0, the marginal benefit function is conca¨e and r q ␦ c - Reordering terms,
Thus, an increase in variance increases the optimal level of capital. For 2 Ž . Ѩ wrѨWѨK -0 the denominator of the right hand side of 27 is positive for a convex marginal benefit function, and the sign for the effect of an increase in variance on the optimal capital stock is unambiguous. This conclusion allows us to present the following result:
Result 2. If Ѩ 2 wrѨ WѨ K is negati¨e, the marginal benefit function is convex, and there exists an optimal value for the capital stock, an increase in variance implies a higher capital stock for water flow at its expected value.
When Ѩ 2 wrѨ WѨ K is negative and the marginal benefit function is convex, an increase in the variance rate implies that more capital is required to avoid or reduce damages from the realization of low values of water resources given that now the probability of these extreme events is higher. If the marginal benefit function is concave the effect is ambiguous. With a concave marginal benefit, the Ž . net marginal value of the capital stock can be increasing or decreasing. With a decreasing marginal value an increment in variance would imply lower capital stock. 13 This somewhat counter-intuitive result is another example of the mischief caused by nonconvexity, here the presence of increasing returns in the water distribution technology.
ASYMMETRIC ADJUSTMENT COSTS: THE RANGE OF INACTION
In the standard neoclassical theory of investment it is well known that asymmetw x ric adjustment costs produce a range of inaction for investment 10, 1, 2, 3 . The result is based on Tobin's q model which says that if there exists an asymmetry between the purchase and sale prices of capital goods, two critical levels q and m q m can be defined such that if q, the increase in the value of the firm that would result if the capital stock were increased by one unit, lies between these critical levels, zero investment is optimal. Here we obtain a similar result, but using what
instead of Tobin's q, which is more difficult to calculate, requiring the solution of a Ž . partial differential equation like our earlier Eq. 8 .
Asymmetric Capital Purchase and Sale Costs
Letting c equal the purchase price of capital goods and c the sale price, we can p s Ž . rewrite optimality condition 26 as
s K Ž . Condition 28 allows us to define a range of inaction for the variance of the wŽ 2 . Ž 2 . m x random variable W, i.e., an interval , such that if changes in variance m stay within that interval, effects on the optimal stock are null and no investment takes place. This is shown in Fig. 2 Ž . When the marginal benefit function is concave an increase in variance shifts downward the net marginal value function. Then with constant marginal cost and a decreasing marginal value that movement would cause a reduction in the optimal capital stock. The effect for an increasing marginal value is not determined because the long-run equilibrium for the capital stock is not well defined. On the other hand, when Ѩ 2 wrѨ WѨ K is positive, an increase in variance implies a lower capital stock for water flow at its expected value if the marginal benefit function is concave and has an undetermined effect if is convex.
14 In this result we analyze the range of inaction only for a convex marginal benefit function and Ѩ 2 wrѨ WѨ K -0. The extension to a concave marginal benefit function with Ѩ 2 wrѨ WѨ K ) 0 is straightforward and presents minimal changes. 
The F и, и functions are implicit functions in and K defined by the optimality condition for the two prices when the water resources are equal to their Ž . Ž . expected value. In other words, given r q ␦ and W, the functions F и, и associate of a range of inaction means that, given any level of capital stock and storage capacity, it will not be optimal to disinvest at least until the variance falls below the Ž 2 . critical value , and it will not be optimal to invest again until the variance m Ž 2 . m rises above the critical value .
2 Ž 2 . m Thus in Fig. 2 we have that for a given value of , for instance , the long-run optimal value for capital stock is K * at the intersection between the marginal cost line and the net marginal value curve of capital assuming that the initial capital stock is less than the optimal. Then, from this position, an increase in variance will move the net marginal value curve to the right, for x because the marginal benefit of a reduction, r q ␦ c y NMV Ј, K * , and the s wŽ 2 .
x Ž . marginal benefit of an increase, NMV Ј, K * y r q ␦ c , are both negative. The distance between the critical values depends on the difference between the 2 Ž . purchase and sale prices given that the elasticity of A W, , K with respect to Ž 2 . the variance is equal to one since A is an increasing, linear function of , so a big difference between these prices implies long periods of inaction for investment in water resource infrastructure. A comparison with previous models of investment with asymmetric adjustment costs is worth noting here. We define the critical levels in terms of the¨ariance of the random variable W. In Tobin's q model, the critical levels are defined in terms of an unobservable q, the effect on the value function Ž . like our J of an increment of capital. In principle, development of empirical counterparts should be easier for our model.
Costly Re¨ersibility
We turn now to what seems to us the most realistic and therefore the most interesting, case: costly disinvestment. Contrary to what we have assumed thus far, there may be no market for the capital stock accumulated to accommodate water reserves, or in other words, c equals zero. Further, and more importantly, there s can be a cost of disinvestment, especially when it is recognized that disinvestment implies restoring something like the pre-project environment.
To develop the analysis of this case, we shall need to redefine the adjustment cost function of Section 2 as This is clear also when we consider the decision to invest, rather than to disinvest. Suppose disinvestment has occurred, from K * in Fig. 3 to a Finally, it is important to note that the linearity assumption for the adjustment cost function is not critical to our results because we know that a convex component of an adjustment cost function will be zero at the long run equilibrium.
Ž . Suppose we include a convex adjustment cost term in our function: cI q c I , a X Ž .
Y Ž . where c I ) 0 and c I ) 0. Then the marginal adjustment cost specified in our a a X Ž . optimality condition is c q c I , and the second term vanishes when I s 0. a Therefore, neither our optimality condition for the long-run equilibrium capital stock nor our results on the influence of uncertainty will be affected. This point is strengthened if we recall from the theory of investment that adjustment costs do Ž . not affect long run equilibria, rather the adjustment speed toward the long run equilibria, i.e., they modify the investment process, not the long run value of the capital stock.
CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we have studied the socially optimal investment in water storage capacity, taking into account that the supply of the resource is uncertain because of the variability of the hydrological cycle. The motivation for the study is the perception that climate change is likely to affect the hydrological cycle, in many regions, by increasing its variability, i.e., increasing uncertainty about future water resources availability.
We model water resources as a stochastic process and focus on the determination of long-run water storage capacity. The model takes into account that to build a certain level of reserves requires investment in public capital stock or infrastructure and that environmental costs are associated with this investment, as the pre-project environment will typically yield some benefit in its natural state. We find that under uncertainty and con¨ex marginal benefits there exists an incentive Ž . to build a certain level of water reserves invest in water resources infrastructure thereby avoiding drastic reductions in consumption that would otherwise be occasioned by drought. Further, we find that long-run water storage capacity is positively related to the level of uncertainty. An increment in the variance of water resources increases the long-run equilibrium level of the capital stock or water storage capacity. As an increase in the variance rate means an increase in the probability of occurrence of extreme values of water resources, more reserves will be required to reduce potential future losses.
On the other hand, we show that when adjustment costs are asymmetric there exists a range of inaction for investment in water resources infrastructure. In that case the stability of the long-run capital stock increases with respect to changes in variance. Finally, we study this issue when there is no market for the infrastructure capital stock, and when disinvestment is costly. In our model, disinvestment in water resource infrastructure is interpreted to include investment in environmental restoration. We find that reversibility of investment in water resource infrastructure is increasing with the social valuation of environmental assets and decreasing with the cost of reversal, and that here too a range of inaction appears. Moreover, the range of inaction is larger; for cost of reversal sufficiently high, the investment is in effect irreversible. stant with respect to water consumption. Written in this way the right-hand side of Bellman equation can be interpreted as the benefits associated with water consumption and then the third condition would require that these benefits be positive. Figure 4 illustrates a possible solution for the maximization problem in Ž .
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Bellman's equation assuming that ⌬ W, K, S ) 0. Notice that in the figure w* Ž . Ž . will be a maximum if the value RHS w* is greater than RHS 0 and the restriction w F W q S is not operative: w* -W q S.
Finally, we can also present some results for the following case: U s aw ␣ , with a ) 0 and ␣ -1, and C s dw ␤ , with d ) 0 and ␤ -1. If ␣ -␤ and the first order condition is satisfied, the second order condition selects a local maximum that under certain not very restrictive conditions is also a global maximum. However, if ␣ ) ␤ the local maximum will be a global maximum only under more restrictive conditions than in the previous case. If these condition do not hold the optimal policy consists of consuming all available water in each moment and, therefore, it will not be optimal to store water.
